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As of April 5th, the Federal Health Ministry reported 2,143 confirmed cases of
COVID-19 in Mexico. International experience suggests that the country is at the
cusp of confronting the full effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This post provides a
description of the constitutional and statutory regulation of emergency powers and
a brief commentary on the government’s actions thus far. It starts by offering an
account of the constitutional provision of emergency powers, noting from the outset
a disinclination to the prospect or desirability of their application. Then, it describes
the emergency powers to confront a health crisis contained in statutory form. Finally,
it evaluates the government’s response to the pandemic.
Constitutional Emergency Powers
Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution provides for the possibility of suspending rights
in the cases of ‘invasion, grave breach of the peace, or any other which puts society
in grave danger or conflict’. In 2011, the extent of these emergency powers, as
well as the oversight regarding their use, were overhauled in the context of a major
rights reform. The exercise of these powers is in the hands of the President, but their
establishment is subject to approval by the Federal Legislature or, if the Federal
Legislature is in recess, by the Permanent Commission (a body made up of 37
legislators from both chambers of the Federal Legislature, which only exists during
its biannual recesses and to which the Constitution grants only a limited number of
powers, one of which is calling the Federal Legislature to an extraordinary session).
Only the Federal Legislature, however, can grant the President any extraordinary
legislative powers. The Presidential decree ordering the suspension must be limited
in its duration and the Federal Legislature is given final authority to revoke it at any
point before its expiration. The exercise of these powers must be proportionate,
and their use is subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the
Constitution enlists a considerable number of rights, along with the institutional
guarantees for their protection, that are not susceptible to being suspended. This list
closely resembles the one contained in Article 27.2 of the American Convention on
Human Rights.
The constitutional provision concerning emergency powers, therefore, calls for the
intervention of both the legislative and judicial branches. In addition, these political
and legal safeguards cannot be overridden or side-lined by the executive by, for
example, suspending their operation. In this regard, Article 65 of the Constitution
establishes a parliamentary calendar composed of biannual ordinary sessions
and Article 67 allows for the holding of extraordinary sessions at the behest of the
Permanent Commission. For its part, the operation of the federal judiciary (with
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the exception of the Supreme Court) is determined by the Federal Judicial Council
(an independent administrative body composed of 7 members and headed by the
President of the Supreme Court). On March 17th, in light of the COVID-19 threat, the
Federal Judicial Council temporarily suspended the operation of all federal tribunals
with the exception of those that are required in order to deal with urgent matters. The
Supreme Court, for its part, has also decided to temporarily suspend its activities
save for urgent matters which may call for the issuing of temporary injunctions.
Despite the presence of these emergency powers since the Constitution’s inception
in 1917 (albeit in a decidedly different form) and notwithstanding the multiple
situations in which the conditions for their use have arguably been met (suffice it to
recall the tragic and enduring sequels associated with the so-called ‘war on drugs’),
they have only been triggered once, in 1942, as a result of Mexico’s participation in
World War II. The lack of appetite for suspending rights by invoking the emergency
powers contained in Article 29 of the Constitution seems to apply also to the
COVID-19 crisis, as there has been no indication from the government that it
intends to pursue this alternative. More likely, the relevant legal grounding of the
government’s actions for the foreseeable future will continue to be the ‘extraordinary
actions’ contained in the National Health Law (Ley General de Salud).
Statutory Emergency Powers
The constitutional basis for governmental action concerning health-related
contingencies is found in Article 4 of the Constitution, which recognises the
right to the protection of health and designates it as a shared matter, with the
exact scheme of power-sharing between the federation and the federal entities
determined by the National Health Law enacted by the Federal Legislature. This
constitutional arrangement is further complicated by Article 73.XVI.1a which creates
a National Health Council subordinate only to the President and empowered to
enact ‘regulations’ for the entire country and Article 73.XVI.2a which allows the
Federal Ministry of Health to take all ‘preventative measures’ in the case of ‘grave
pandemics’. Regarding the nature of these regulations and measures, the Second
Chamber of the Supreme Court has determined that they are hierarchically inferior
to statutes. As for the precise relationship between these two bodies, in the context
of a sanitary emergency Article 13.A.V of the National Health Law centralizes all
executive authority in the hands of the Federal Ministry of Health. Nevertheless, on
March 23rd and 30th, the National Health Council issued proclamations declaring
COVID-19 a ‘grave disease requiring preferential attention’ and a ‘sanitary
emergency by virtue of force majeure’, respectively.
The essence of the government’s response to the COVID-19 challenge is found in
the decrees of March 24th, 27th, 31st and April 3rd issued by the Federal Ministry of
Health. Several of the measures contained in these decrees, such as the temporary
suspension of all educational activities and the ban on large public gatherings, have
the purpose of promoting social distancing to contain the spread of the disease. It
is important to note, however, that no lockdown or curfew has been set: people are
only encouraged but not mandated to stay indoors. However, all activities considered
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to be non-essential, as defined by the decree, have been suspended until April
30th. What this suspension entails for employment relations has become a matter
of some controversy, which I consider briefly below. The decrees also include very
broad authorisations for the Federal Ministry of Health to: make use of all medical
resources, regardless of their public or private character; buy and import all goods
and services without observing the ordinary procedures, and; avoid price increases
and hoarding of essential goods and services. These measures are grounded in
Article 184 of the National Health Law which, in addition, allows the Federal Ministry
of Health to: order executive authorities at every level of government and all medical
professionals to undertake all measures deemed necessary: enact regulations
concerning the gathering and movement of the population; regulate land, maritime,
and air traffic, and; use all forms of communication freely and preferentially.
These sweeping measures are, of course, subject to judicial review by the federal
judiciary, with the expected approach concerning the restriction of fundamental
rights falling squarely within the paradigm that Kai Möller has termed ‘the global
model of constitutional rights’. Over the last 15 years, proportionality analysis has
gradually become a common feature of Mexican jurisprudence. Disputes arising
from the distribution of competences would fall within the remit of the Supreme Court
under a process known as a ‘constitutional controversy’ (controversia constitucional).
Already, for example, there is some disagreement brewing between the authorities of
the state of Jalisco and the federal authorities regarding the authorisations required
to import rapid test-kits. The Federal Legislature, for its part, could also choose
to limit the extent of these measures or to redefine the power-sharing scheme by
amending the authorising statute.
Evaluation of the Government’s Response
Mexico’s statutory emergency framework, then, seems to provide the authorities
with enough leeway to accomplish all necessary public health objectives efficiently,
while at the same time maintaining the ordinary institutional safeguards. It is hard to
think of any benefit that could arise from appealing to the constitutional emergency
provisions. It remains to be seen, however, what use the executive authorities
actually make of these prerogatives. The actions undertaken by the Mexican
government have been sluggish and reluctant (considering the knowledge gained
from the current situation in other countries where the spread of the disease is in a
more advanced stage), leading to uncoordinated actions taken at the state and local
levels, such as banning the sale of alcohol and instituting curfews. Moreover, the
President’s attitude to the imminent crisis can best be described as indifferent: on
March 18th, for example, he described the religious images he carries in his wallet
as his ‘protective shields’ and, then, on March 22nd he encouraged the population
to go out and behave as they normally would. In a more cynical tone, on April 2nd
he described the situation (roughly translated) as ‘a blessing in disguise’ (‘como
anillo al dedo’). Finally, in an hour-long address to the nation on April 5th, he touted
the social programmes which have become emblematic of his administration but
failed to provide any clarity over the implementation of measures aimed directly at
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lessening the economic impact of the pandemic. On a more positive note, on April
7th the government announced it had hired 3,000 medical professionals with the view
of increasing the number in the coming weeks.
Perhaps the government’s business-as-usual attitude can best be captured by
its interpretation regarding the effects of its decrees over employment relations.
In the government’s view, declaring COVID-19 a “sanitary emergency by virtue
of force majeure” does not entail any modification of the rights of employers and
employees. This view defies any good-faith attempt to interpret Articles 427.VII
and 429.IV of the Federal Labour Law (Ley Federal del Trabajo) which provide,
respectively, for the temporary suspension of all labour relations ‘in cases of sanitary
contingency declared by the competent health authorities’ and fix the compensation
for employees at the minimum wage for a maximum period of one month (slightly
under 5€ a day, having increased considerably over the past couple of years).
In practice, this means that most employees would suffer a sharp reduction in
their income. These provisions were incorporated into the law in 2012 as a direct
response to the 2009 AH1N1 epidemic, as is evident from the parliamentary record.
Political disagreement with the fact that these provisions mean that employees must
bear the brunt of the burden arising from a situation such as the current one is not
a good reason to misinterpret the law. Rather, it presents the government with an
excellent opportunity to propose the law’s amendment so that it aligns with their
avowed political commitments, especially given the comfortable majorities that the
‘leftist’ ruling party currently enjoys in both chambers of the Federal Legislature.
Contrary to the situation in other countries where the main concern regarding
emergency powers is their potential for abuse, for the time being at least, the
more immediate fear in Mexico is that a reluctance to respond decidedly to the
pandemic will only exacerbate the decay of the social fabric. Fortunately, any further
restrictions to civil liberties seem to be off the table. But what is most concerning is
the apparent lack of political will to put into place any significant actions aimed at
curbing the worst effects of this crisis, such as those economic and fiscal measures
implemented in other countries. The government’s pursuit of its ‘republican austerity’
policy seems particularly ill-advised in light of present circumstances. Staying home
for the foreseeable future is not a viable alternative for the millions of persons
who rely on their daily income for subsistence, especially for those engaged in
informal economic activities. But neither is requiring them to go on as usual if it
means endangering their health. The advent of an economic crisis leading to higher
unemployment rates without adequate state support could force many individuals
to turn to the criminal enterprises that are responsible for most of the human rights
abuses that continue to plague the country. It is too early to tell if Mexico will manage
to weather the storm that is predicted to occur, but being ill-prepared to face the
challenge could prove disastrous.
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